Save This Word! See synonyms for artifact on Thesaurus. Digital Technology. Ghosting artifacts in an MRI are usually the result of patient movement during a scan. The video appears to be heavily artifacted. We could talk until we're blue in the face about this quiz on words for the color "blue," but we think you should take the quiz and find out if you're a whiz at these colorful terms. Words nearby artifact articulator , articulatory feature , articulatory loop , articulatory phonetics , Artie , artifact , artifacting , artifactitious , artifice , artificer , artificial.
Words related to artifact antiquity , heirloom , relic , deceit , falsehood , fiction , forgery , myth , untruth , art , craft , amount , brand , commodity , crop , device , fruit , merchandise , output , produce. This continuum problem for artifacts is really just a version of a well-known problem besetting classification schemes in the natural and social sciences.
The traditional assumption was that classification is an exclusively ontological operation. What we are doing, it is often said, is carving the world at its joints. On this assumption, a continuum is a problem because it suggests that there are no joints to guide our carving efforts.
A continuum is thus incompatible with classification schemes understood as grounded solely in objective features of the world, and with essentialist understandings of natural kinds. We can, of course, carve the continuum up any way we like, but this must be understood as in part a pragmatic operation, not a strictly ontological one reflecting only the fixed essences of things. This problem has loomed large in discussions of natural kinds in philosophy of science, as bothersome continua are increasingly identified in both natural and social sciences.
In response, he advocates an account of natural kinds that incorporates the influence of human interests and epistemic concerns, while still insisting that these interests and concerns are constrained by objective features of the world identifiable by science.
Understood in this way, classification schemes such as those proposed by Hilpinen and Dipert could, in principle, constitute a perfectly adequate response to the continuum problem. It would, of course, be nice to have a commonly accepted scheme in philosophy—or better yet, a scheme shared with the other disciplines that study artifacts and material culture.
But even failing that, classification schemes grounded in clear methodological considerations would be helpful, even if the methodological considerations varied from scheme to scheme. Unfortunately, it appears that the main consideration driving the schemes proposed so far is merely the desire to shore up the traditional ontological distinction between artifacts and naturally occurring objects. This leaves the methodological challenge voiced by Sperber and Miller unanswered.
What do we need this distinction for? Does it help us understand how objects function in human life and culture, or does it actually hinder this understanding? If the latter, would other distinctions serve us better?
The continuum problem does not, pace Sperber, prove that there are no good methodological considerations in favor of maintaining the ontological divide between artifacts and naturally occurring objects.
We are thus left with more questions than answers in the matter of definition. Discussions of the metaphysics of artifacts have typically taken place only in broader investigative contexts in which they are not the primary focus of attention.
In particular, the metaphysics of ordinary objects has generated a significant literature in recent years, and the puzzles about existence around which it revolves do apply to artifacts, but equally to the vast array of other ordinary objects, like stones, stars, trees, jellyfish and deer.
Similarly, reflection on artifact kinds has been largely overshadowed by the vast literature on natural kinds. And discussions of artifact function exist on the periphery of the much more prominent discussions of biological function. We will take up these topics in turn.
Skepticism about the existence of artifacts goes back at least to Aristotle. For him, the primary existents are substances—independent things on which all other things depend. Individual things, such as horses or houses, are compounds of matter and form, but it is not entirely clear whether the substance of the thing is the form, the matter, or the compound Shields That said, Aristotle is clearly ambivalent as to whether artifacts have what it takes.
In the Physics b8—39 , for instance, he says that some things, such as chipmunks or geraniums, exist by nature and that each such thing is a substance. He follows this up in the Metaphysics b15—25 , saying that perhaps only such things as exist by nature are substances, thus implying that things made by art, such as pots or pincushions, are not.
Exactly why Aristotle thinks artifacts are not substances is not entirely clear—he suggests different reasons in different places Katayama 18— But it is clear that he doubts that they really exist in the full sense enjoyed by things that exist by nature. Even after the baleful anti-metaphysical influence of logical positivism waned, metaphysics took itself to be merely working out the details of what the dominant scientific theories, particularly in physics and biology, say exists.
Since there is no science of artifacts, let alone of sticks and stones and rivers, such ordinary objects had to be eliminated from our ontologies. On the radical left fringe of the eliminativist spectrum is a startling long list of theorists who deny the existence of ordinary objects tout court , including even living organisms and persons for the list, see Korman 19— In the moderate middle are theorists such as Trenton Merricks , who denies the existence of artifacts and other inanimate macrophysical objects, as well as living organisms, with the exception of humans; Peter van Inwagen , who denies the existence of artifacts and other inanimate macrophysical objects, but accepts the existence of living organisms, including humans; and Simon Evnine , who denies the existence of inanimate natural objects, but accepts the existence of artifacts and living organisms.
The arguments for these varieties of eliminativism are themselves various, but they revolve around what Daniel Korman 4—7 calls debunking arguments. Why do we think that ordinary objects exist? Only because they correspond to our human needs and interests, as embodied in our biology and enshrined in our cultural practices. But there is no good reason to think that the objects we pick out in accordance with our needs and interests correspond to the objects that actually exist in reality.
Debunking arguments go back to the very beginning of Western philosophy. Parmenides declared that what truly is—Being, or the One—cannot be multiple, changing and transient after the fashion of ordinary objects. Plato followed up with the doctrine of the eternal and unchanging Forms, which truly exist, and of which ordinary objects are at best ontologically deficient copies.
Thus the idea that we have no good reason to think that ordinary objects exist is entrenched in our metaphysical tradition. On the other hand, prima facie grounds for rehabilitating ordinary objects also have ancient roots in atomism, which holds that macrophysical objects are composed of particles which, while multiple, do meet the other criteria for true being laid down by Parmenides.
On the assumption that composition follows regular principles, then, ordinary objects may be said to exist insofar as they are wholes composed of existing proper parts. This brings us face to face with what Peter van Inwagen 21 ff. Answering this question has turned out to be far from simple, and has latterly given rise to mereology, a special area of metaphysics devoted to investigating the principles of composition.
Most of the other main arguments against the existence of artifacts and other ordinary objects reflect problems arising in the course of these investigations. For example, there is the material constitution problem. An artifact such as a cookie is made out of dough.
So everywhere there is a cookie there is a coincident lump of baked dough, which shares all of its parts with the cookie. But this coincidence violates our intuitions about the identity of ordinary objects.
Considerations of this sort have been used by van Inwagen ff. Cookie makers do not bring anything new into existence; they merely move pre-existing elementary things around. Thus, while debunking arguments show that we have no good reason to believe ordinary objects do exist, mereological problems show that we have good reasons to believe they do not.
A growing chorus of voices has been raised against this ontological downgrading of ordinary objects, several of whom have been especially concerned to rehabilitate artifacts.
Baker subscribes to a constitution view, according to which material things are non-reductively made up of other material things. The fundamental idea of constitution is this: when a thing of one primary kind is in certain circumstances, a thing of another primary kind—a new thing, with new causal powers—comes to exist.
When an octagonal piece of metal is in circumstances of being painted red with white marks of the shape S-T-O-P, and is in an environment that has certain conventions and laws, a new thing—a traffic sign—comes into existence. Baker Importantly, for Baker artifacts are intention-dependent ID objects—they cannot exist in the absence of beings with relevant intentional states. Thus the cosmic ray striking a sheet of scrap metal in the proverbial swamp and turning it red with white lettering has not created any artifact at all, let alone a stop sign.
Baker builds the intentional states into the specification of the required circumstances in terms of a relationship between the construction materials and the intentions and knowledge of the constructor. For a stop sign to exist, for example, it must be constructed from metal and paint by someone who understands the function of stop signs, knows how to construct one, intends to construct one to fulfill this function, and is reasonably successful in executing her intentions 53— Both of these views are aimed at first distinguishing natural from artificial objects and then downgrading the latter.
Baker argues that the distinction itself is suspect, both in light of technologies such as genetic engineering and the natural status of the beings with intentional states who create artifacts 59— In short, the whole process of making artifacts is internal to nature and cannot be legitimately considered separate from it by those inclined to be judgmental in ontological matters.
Simon Evnine argues for a version of hylomorphism that is very similar to the constitution view espoused by Baker.
Evnine abandons traditional notions of form and focuses instead on the intertwining of the causes that bring a thing into existence and make it the thing it is. Artifacts thus take pride of place in his metaphysics, because, he claims, they typically have a specifiable origin in the intentions of a maker who chooses material and works it up in accordance with an envisioned function and shape. But he does not try to account for non-living natural objects, whose existence he denies.
On the other hand, Evnine deploys his account of artifacts in an interesting way to argue that actions are artifacts—artifactual events rather than artifactual objects. Amie Thomasson a; and for a succinct summary, takes a different tack, arguing that the existence of artifacts and other ordinary objects is established by the connection between our terms on the one hand, and facts about the world on the other.
On her view, the meaning of our terms includes a specification of the conditions for their application. If we then determine empirically that the application conditions of a term are met, the thing to which it refers exists. A quick check of any kitchen will assure you that these conditions are in fact satisfied, and that spoons therefore exist. Check the music studios and the concert halls as thoroughly as you like, you will not find these conditions satisfied. But she makes the intention-dependent status of artifacts equally comprehensible, since the intentional states of makers figure prominently in the application conditions of concepts.
If artifacts do not exist, then the kinds into which we classify them—pillow, book, painting, flowerpot—are not real kinds on a par with natural kinds, such as oak, owl or anole. But questions about the reality and nature of artifact kinds also arise for those who do take artifacts to exist. As we have seen, these theorists resist the objection that the mind-dependence of artifacts compromises their ontological status. But this objection resurfaces with regard to artifact kinds.
The mind-dependence of artifacts implies, at a minimum, that an account of artifact kinds will be very different from an account of natural kinds. This implication is resisted by Crawford Elder , , who seeks to establish the existence of artifacts on the basis of a realist account of kinds. A copied kind is defined by a set of properties that naturally cluster together—a distinctive shape or make-up, a proper function established by a mechanism that copies things of that shape on the basis of successful performance, and a historically proper placement.
Similarly, floor lamps are distinctively shaped artifacts that are copied from household to household by a socially based reproductive mechanism because they help humans get around in the dark by performing successfully as light sources strategically located with respect to other household furniture.
Human intentional states do, of course, figure in the copying process for artifacts. However, Elder argues:. Rather, the essential properties that his product will inherit stem from a history of function and of copying that began well before the artisan undertook his work. Elder — All copied kinds are thus natural, mind-independent kinds whose clustered features we discover rather than invent.
Neckties, for example, do not qualify because they do not appear to have a proper function Elder — But his account does have the virtue of drawing out useful analogies between natural kinds and artifact kinds. Amie Thomasson does not share this fear. In a series of important papers , b, , she points out that realists about kinds are not, in fact, forced to choose between showing that artifact kinds can be understood on the mind-independent model of natural kinds, or denying that artifact kinds are real.
There is a third option—denying that mind-independence is the touchstone of reality. Thomasson then builds human intentions and their historical connections into her account of artifact kinds. Necessarily, for all x and all artifactual kinds K , x is a K only if x is the product of a largely successful intention that Kx , where one intends Kx only if one has a substantive concept of the nature of K s that largely matches that of some group of prior makers of K s if there are any and intends to realize that concept by imposing K -relevant features on the object.
Thomasson Thus for Thomasson, human intentions and concepts are actually constitutive of artifact kinds. Thomasson also objects to the common assumption that concepts of artifact kinds revolve exclusively around intended function. While it is true that—in English, anyway—we often label artifact kinds in accordance with function—flashlight, bedspread, pincushion, frying pan, and so on—artifacts actually have an array of features that figure in their concepts.
These include structural or perceptible features, for example, that are also often reflected in our terms—armchair, tripod, zebra crossing definitely not a function designation!
Most importantly for Thomasson, they also include normative features concerned with how that kind of artifact is to be treated or regarded.
Although sponges and paper towels can both be used to wipe up spills, it is normal to dispose of the paper towel, but to clean the sponge and reuse it. Paleopathology is the study of disease in ancient cultures.
Paleopathology is also a subdiscipline of historical archaeology. Paleopathologists may investigate the presence of specific diseases, what areas lacked certain diseases, and how different communities reacted to disease.
By studying the history of a disease, paleopathologists may contribute to an understanding of the way modern diseases progress. By studying the teeth of ancient people, for example, paleopathologists can deduce what kinds of food they ate, how often they ate, and what nutrient s the foods contained.
Historic archaeology incorporates written records into archaeological research. One of the most famous examples of historic archaeology is the discovery and decipherment of the Rosetta Stone. The Rosetta Stone is a large slab of marble discovered near Rashid, Egypt, by French archaeologists in It became an important tool of historic archaeology. The stone is inscribed with a decree made on behalf of Pharaoh Ptolemy V. The decree was written and carved into the stone in three different languages: hieroglyphic, demotic , and Greek.
Hieroglyphics are the picture-symbols used for formal documents in ancient Egypt. Demotic is the informal script of ancient Egypt.
Before the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, Egyptologist s did not understand hieroglyphics or demotic. They could, however, understand Greek. Using the Greek portion of the Rosetta Stone, archaeologists and linguists were able to translate the text and decipher hieroglyphs.
This knowledge has contributed vastly to our understanding of Egyptian history. Historic archaeology contributes to many disciplines, including religious studies.
The Dead Sea Scrolls , for instance, are a collection of about documents. The tightly rolled parchment and other writing sheets were found between and in 11 caves near Qumran, West Bank, near the Dead Sea. Discovery of the scrolls has increased our knowledge of the development of Judaism and Christianity. A subdiscipline of historic archaeology is industrial archaeology. Industrial archaeologists study materials that were created or used after the Industrial Revolution of the s and s.
The Industrial Revolution was strongest in Western Europe and North America, so most industrial archaeologists study artifacts found there. One of the most important sites for industrial archaeologists is the Ironbridge Gorge in Shropshire, England.
The River Severn runs through the gorge , and during the Industrial Revolution, it allowed for the transport of raw material s such as coal , limestone , and iron.
Other Disciplines Ethnoarchaeologist s study how people use and organize objects today. They use this knowledge to understand how people used tools in the past.
Archaeologists researching the ancient San culture of southern Africa, for instance, study the way modern San culture functions. Until the midth century, the San, maintained a somewhat nomadic lifestyle based on hunting and gathering. Although the San culture had evolved significantly, archaeologists studying the tools of the modern San could still study the way ancient San tracked and hunted animals and gathered native plants. Environmental archaeologists help us understand the environmental conditions that influenced people in the past.
Sometimes, environmental archaeology is called human paleoecology. The forest grew as the climate became wetter. Experimental archaeologist s replicate the techniques and processes people used to create or use objects in the past. Often, re-creating an ancient workshop or home helps experimental archaeologists understand the process or method used by ancient people to create features or artifacts.
One of the most famous examples of experimental archaeology is the Kon-Tiki , a large raft built by Norwegian explorer Thor Heyerdahl. In , Heyerdahl sailed the Kon-Tiki from South America to Polynesia to show that ancient mariner s, with the same tools and technology, could have navigate d the vast Pacific Ocean.
Forensic archaeologist s sometimes work with geneticist s to support or question DNA evidence. More often, they excavate the remains of victims of murder or genocide in areas of conflict. The Killing Fields are the sites of mass grave s of thousands of victims of the Khmer Rouge regime of the s. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, forensic archaeologists studied the remains of the bodies in the Killing Fields, discovering how and when they died.
The forensic archaeologists helped establish that the Khmer Rouge used starvation and overwork , as well as direct killing, to silence opponents of the regime. Archaeologists working in the field of cultural resource management help assess and preserve remains on sites where construction is scheduled to occur.
Archaeologists working as cultural resource managers often collaborate with local governments to balance the infrastructure and commercial needs of a community with historic and cultural interests represented by artifacts and features found on construction sites.
Where to Dig? Most archaeology involves digging. Wind s and flood s carry sand , dust and soil , depositing them on top of abandoned features and artifacts. These deposits build up over time, burying the remains. Sometimes catastrophe s, like volcanic eruption s, speed up this burial process. In places where earth has been carved away—like in the Grand Canyon in the U. Cities and communities also tend to be built in layers.
Rome, Italy, has been an urban center for thousands of years. The streets of downtown Rome today are several meters higher than they were during the time of Julius Caesar. Centuries of Romans have built it up— medieval home on top of ancient home, modern home on top of medieval home.
Establishing a dig site in an inhabited area can be a very difficult process. Archaeologists looking for an ancient Roman fortress , for instance, may have to first excavate a Renaissance bakery and medieval hospital. Because most artifacts lie underground, scientists have developed methods to help them figure out where they should dig. Sometimes they choose sites based on old myth s and stories about where people lived or where events occurred.
The ancient city of Troy , written about by Greek poet Homer as early as BCE, was thought to be a work of fiction. Using the Iliad as a guide, German amateur archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann discovered the ruins of the city near the town of Hisarlik, Turkey, in Sometimes, archaeologists use historical map s to find ancient artifacts.
Before securing a site, an archaeological team surveys the area, looking for signs of remains. These might include artifacts on the ground or unusual mounds in the earth. New technology has greatly increased their ability to survey an area.
For example, aerial and satellite imagery can show patterns that might not be visible from the ground. Other technologies give clues about what lies under the surface. These techniques involve radar and sonar.
Radar and sonar technologies often use radio wave s, electrical current s, and laser s. Archaeologists send these signals into the earth. As the signals hit something solid, they bounce back up to the surface. Scientists study the time and paths the signals take to familiarize themselves with the underground landscape. Accidental finds can also lead archaeologists to dig sites.
For instance, farmers plowing their fields might come across sherd s of pottery. A construction crew might discover ruins beneath a building site. Another monumental discovery was made by accident. In , agricultural workers in Xian, China, were digging a well. The complex includes 8, life-sized clay soldiers, horses, chariot s, and artillery , popularly known as the Terra Cotta Warriors.
The archaeological research surrounding the Terra Cotta Warriors has provided insight on the organization and leadership style of Qin Shi Huangdi and the development of Chinese culture. Once a site is chosen, archaeologists must get permission to dig from the landowner. If it is public land, they must obtain the proper permit s from the local, state, or federal government.
Before moving a single grain of dirt, archaeologists make maps of the area and take detailed photographs. Once they begin digging, they will destroy the original landscape, so it is important to record how things looked beforehand. The last step before digging is to divide the site into a grid to keep track of the location of each find.
Then archaeologists choose sample squares from the grid to dig. This allows the archaeological team to form a complete study of the area. They also leave some plots on the grid untouched. Archaeologists like to preserve portions of their dig sites for future scientists to study—scientists who may have better tools and techniques than are available today. For example, during the Great Depression in the s, programs to create jobs led to many archaeological digs around the United States.
Some scientists on these digs removed artifacts, such as pottery, but threw away charcoal and animal bones. These items were considered junk. Today, scientists are able to carbon-date the charcoal and analyze the bones to see what kinds of animals people were domesticating and eating at the time. It is important that archaeologists today keep some parts of each site pristine. Not all archaeology involves digging in the earth. Journal of Archaeological Science — CrossRef Google Scholar.
Gould, R. New York: Academic. Henderson, J. The Science and Archaeology of Materials : An investigation of inorganic materials. London: Routledge.
Jakes, Kathryn A. Archaeological Chemistry: Materials, Methods, and Meaning. American Chemical Society. Rosenfeld, A. The Inorganic Raw Materials ofAntiquity. Tait, H. Five Thousand Years of Glass.
0コメント